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The Case of the Recalcitrant Client:
The Dilemma of the Insurer When
the Insured Fails to Cooperate
DOUGLAS A. HAYDEL*
DONALD E. SHAVER**
In almost any field of liability insurance, the standard insurance pol-
icy contains a "cooperation clause" requiring the insured to cooperate
with the insurer in settling claims and litigation under the policy.
Breach of this cooperation clause by the insured is usually not a prob-
lem since the interests of the insurance company and the insured are
parallel. In certain cases, however, the insured, for unknown and often
irrational reasons, handicaps the company's efforts to prepare a defense
to a claim by irresponsible behavior. All too often the result in such
cases is that the plaintiff ends up with a default judgment or a verdict
for an amount far in excess of the reasonable value of the case. Of
course, the insurance company is left "holding the bag." Under the law
as it currently exists in California, it is difficult to the point of near
impossibility for the insurer to defend against enforcement of such a
judgment. Even where there is a clear breach of the duty to cooperate,
the insurer often finds that it has no remedy for this breach. This
anomaly is due to the rule in California that a breach of the coopera-
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tion clause is not actionable unless there is a "substantial likelihood" of
"substantial prejudice" to the insurer.' Moreover, in Billing/on v. Inter-
insurance Exchange,2 the Supreme Court held that for the insured to
show "substantial prejudice", it must show that the trier of fact would
have "found in the insured's favor", had the insured complied with his
duty to cooperate.3
While the precise definition of this phrase has never been tested in
any reported decisions, if applied literally, it would indicate that the
only way to establish "substantial prejudice" is to show that a defense
verdict would have been rendered, but for the breach by the insured.
This article will suggest alternative methods of showing "substantial
prejudice" consistent with Billington and taking into account recent sig-
nificant changes in California law. In particular this article will sug-
gest, first, that the restrictive holding in Billing/on should be modified
to conform to the comparative fault principles enumerated in Li v. Yel-
low Cab Co. 4 such that the insurer may satisfy the burden of proving
"substantial prejudice" by showing that the apportionment of fault
would have been different had the insured cooperated fully. The liabil-
ity of the insurer would therefore be reduced by the proportion of fault
properly attributable to the plaintiff.
Second, this article will suggest that the insurer should also be able
to show prejudice by proving that the noncooperative conduct of the
insured accounted for a significantly larger award of damages to the
plaintiff than if the insured had cooperated, and accordingly, the liabil-
ity of the insurer should be reduced by the amount of damages which
the insurer proves is attributable to the noncooperation by the insured.
In so doing, this article will examine Insurance Code Section 11580,
concerning the enforcement of judgments directly against the insurance
company. The article will then trace the development of the case law
leading up to the decision in Billington requiring the showing of sub-
stantial prejudice to prevail on the defense of breach of the cooperation
clause by the insured. Finally, the article will discuss the application of
the principles in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 5 to the problem of breach of the
cooperation clause in the context of the suggestions made above.
1. See notes 45-73 and accompanying text infra.
2. 71 Cal. 2d 728, 456 P.2d 982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1969).
3. Id. at 737, 456 P.2d at 987, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 33 1.
4. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
5. d
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ENFORCING JUDGMENTS DIRECTLY AGAINST THE INSURANCE
COMPANY: INSURANCE CODE SECTION 11580
Insurance Code Section 11580 provides that when a judgment is se-
cured against the insured, an action for enforcement may be brought
against the insurer based on the insurance policy and subject to its
terms and limitations.6 This provision is implied by law into every in-
surance contract and, in effect, makes anyone negligently injured by the
insured a creditor beneficiary under the policy.7 This provision differs,
however, from a direct action statute in that it is based on an unsatis-
fied judgment.8 The injured party cannot sue the insurance company
directly in the original action, nor may it be joined in the original
action.9
Section 11580 specifically provides that such an action is subject to
the terms and limitations of the policy. 10 Nonetheless, the general rule
that the insurer has all the defenses against the injured party that it
would have against the insured has been considerably eroded." For
instance, although intentional misrepresentations in the application
process will be a good defense against the insured, this may not relieve
the insurance company from liability to the injured party. 2 In addi-
tion, the insured will be bound by a policy provision requiring actions
to be brought within one year after accrual of the right, but the injured
party is bound only by the general four-year statute contained in Code
of Civil Procedure Section 337(1).' 3 Also, an insurer who defends
6. Insurance Code Section 11580 provides in part:
A policy insuring against losses set forth in subdivision (a) shall not be issued or deliv-
ered to any person in this state unless it contains the provisions set forth in subdivision
(b). Such policy, whether or not actually containing such provisions, shall be construed
as if such provisions were embodied therein.
(b) Such policy shall not be thus issued or delivered to any person in this state unless it
contains all the following provisions:
(2) A provision that whenever judgment is secured against the insured or the executor
or administrator of a deceased insured in an action based upon bodily injury, death, or
property damage, then an action may be brought against the insurer on the policy and
subject to its terms and limitations, by such judgment creditor to recover on the
judgment.
7. Zahn v. Canadian Indem. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 509, 512-13, 129 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287-88
(1976).
8. Mel H. Binning, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 615, 619, 141 Cal. Rptr. 547, 548
(1977).
9. Id
10. CAL. INS. CODE §11580(b)(2); see Valladao v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 13 Cal. 2d
322, 328, 89 P.2d 643, 646 (1939).
11. See Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 876, 587 P.2d 1098, 1103, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 290 (1978).
12. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 677, 456 P.2d 674, 686-87, 79
Cal. Rptr. 106, 118-19 (1969).
13. Olds v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 67 Cal. App. 2d 814, 820, 155
P.2d 676, 682 (1945).
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against enforcement of a judgment on the basis of the insured's failure
to cooperate must show "at the very least" the substantial likelihood
that a jury would have found in the insured's favor, had the insured
complied with his duty to cooperate, before relief will be granted. 14
It is this third example upon which this article will focus. Theoreti-
cally, the insurer should be able to raise the affirmative defense of
breach of the cooperation clause in a Section 11580 action where the
insured's conduct is responsible for a default judgment or a verdict far
in excess of the reasonable value. 15 Case law, however, has emascu-
lated this affirmative defense.' 6
Typically when a serious breach of the cooperation clause occurs, a
default judgment against the insured in the underlying action results.' 7
This default judgment may result either by plaintiffs motion, as where
plaintiff moves to have an answer struck under Code of Civil Proce-
dure Section 2034 due to the insured's failure to attend deposition,' 8 or
by defendant's motion, where defense counsel makes a motion to with-
draw based on the insured's lack of cooperation and the insured fails to
defend. 19 Where the insurer withdraws, it avoids the possibility of an
estoppel argument being raised against it later.2 0 The insurer, however,
may be sacrificing its opportunity to limit the damages prayed for in
the complaint, if it is required to pay the default judgment in a subse-
quent Section 11580 action notwithstanding its withdrawal.2' Accord-
ingly, the better route may be to stay in the suit as long as possible with
the hope of reducing the total damages below the default level.
Once the underlying action is terminated, whether by default judg-
ment or trial on the merits, the insurer who believes that the insured
has breached the cooperation clause may either wait for the plaintiff to
bring a Section 11580 action for enforcement,22 or may take the initia-
tive and file a declaratory relief action.23 Although the case law ap-
14. Billington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal. 2d 728, 737, 456 P.2d 982, 987, 79 Cal. Rptr.
326, 331 (1969).
15. Hall v. Travelers Ins. Companies, 15 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308, 93 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161 (1971).
16. See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, eg., Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 304, 384 P.2d 155, 156, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 827, 828 (1963); 15 Cal. App. 3d at 307, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2034(d); see 71 Cal. 2d at 734, 456 P.2d at 985, 79 Cal. Rptr. at
329.
19. See 15 Cal. App. 3d at 307, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
20. But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller, 5 Cal. App. 3d 837, 843, 85 Cal. Rptr.
288, 292 (1970). See generally CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR Calfornia Automobile Insur-
ance Law Guide § 1.23 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
21. See Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 884, 587 P.2d 1098, 1108, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 295 (1978).
22. See, e.g., 71 Cal. 2d at 744-45, 456 P.2d at 992, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 336; 15 Cal. App. 3d at
306, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
23. See 5 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 288. The insurer cannot seek declaratory relief
concerning a breach of the cooperation clause prior to the rendition of a judgment against the
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pears to say that the insurer has no obligation to pay a judgment until a
Section 11580 action has been brought,24 counsel should be alert to the
possibility that an insurer who requires the plaintiff to go to court to
enforce his judgment against the insured when the insurer does not
have a reasonable chance of prevailing in the subsequent action may be
found to have acted in "bad faith."25
Nonetheless, where the insured has breached his duty to cooperate, it
seems fair that the insured should bear the consequences of his actions,
not the insurer. Thus, the question of whether the insured has actually
breached this duty may be an important one.
THE INSURED'S DUTY TO COOPERATE
A standard part of any liability insurance policy, whether it be auto-
mobile, professional, or other, is a clause requiring the insured to coop-
erate with the company in settlement negotiations, attending trials and
hearings, and assisting in securing evidence and witnesses.26 This is
one of the two main duties imposed on the insured in the standard
liability insurance contract. The other, the duty to notify the company
of any accidents or liability claims filed against the insured,27 is related
but outside the scope of this article. However, the same principles
should apply to either.
No case establishes a standard to determine when the insured has
breached his duty to cooperate. Rather, this is a factual question and is
generally determined on a case by case basis.28 In considering whether
the insured has breached his duty to cooperate, counsel should look for
a failure to disclose relevant information,29 intentional misrepresenta-
tion to the company, 30 refusal to permit a defense,3 failure to attend
insured because it would be unable to show prejudice at that premature stage. United Services
Auto. Ass'n v. Martin, 120 Cal. App. 3d 963, 966, 174 Cal. Rptr. 835, 836 (1981).
24. 71 Cal. 2d at 744-45, 456 P.2d at 992, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
25. See generally Shemoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law, 17 TRIAL 23 (May 1981).
26. See generally 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §14.01 (1981); CONTINU-
ING EDUCATION OF THE BAR California Automobile Insurance Law Guide §10.3 (1973).
27. See generally CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR California Automobile Insurance
Law Guide §10.2 (1973).
28. Porter v. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp., 40 Cal. App. 2d 502, 510-11, 104 P.2d 1087, 1092
(1940).
29. The insured may breach his duty to cooperate by failing to make fair and frank disclo-
sure of information reasonably required by the insurer to enable it to determine if there is a
defense or whether the insurer should settle. Ford v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 151 Cal.
App. 2d 431, 440, 311 P.2d 930, 935 (1957). The insured must tell his insurer the complete truth
concerning the facts involved in the complaint, and he must stick to this truthful version through-
out the proceedings. Id It was, however, held that there was no violation of this duty in Ford v.
Providence Washington Insurance Co. even though the insured maintained throughout the action
that he had not been the driver of the car and the jury impliedly found that he had been. Id at
440-41, 311 P.2d at 935.
30. Actual misrepresentation to the insurer of important facts, as well as failing to disclose
important information, may be the basis for a finding of a breach of the cooperation clause. Val-
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deposition or trial,32 failure to participate in trial preparation,33 or col-
lusion with the plaintiff.34
ladao v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 13 Cal. 2d 322, 330, 89 P.2d 643, 647 (1939). Where the
insured repeatedly and wilfully misrepresented to the insurer over a period of five months the
actual conditions prevailing at the time of an accident, the insured was found to have breached the
clause. Id Moreover, where the insured verifies allegations contained in a pleading, the insurer
has a right to rely on the truth of those pleadings in defending the action. Wright v. Farmers
Inter-Insurance Exch., 39 Cal. App. 2d 70, 72, 102 P.2d 352, 354 (1940). If the insured materi-
ally changes his version of the facts in subsequent testimony, this amounts to a breach of the
cooperation clause. Id at 73, 102 P.2d at 354. However, if a misstatement, even an intentional
one, is corrected before it is relied upon, no breach of the cooperation clause is found. Standard
Accident Ins. Co. v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97, 102 (9th Cir. 1952). Moreover, an insured should not be
charged with lack of cooperation simply because of minor variances in various statements, or for
unintentional or accidental mistakes in formal statements made by the insured, 40 Cal. App. 2d at
515, 104 P.2d at 1094. Thus, it has been held that if the insured signs a statement without reading
it in which an adjuster has not accurately recorded what the insurer said, this does not amount to a
breach. 39 Cal. App. 2d at 73, 102 P.2d at 353.
31. Refusal to permit a defense will also amount to a breach of the cooperation clause under
certain conditions. O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 800, 167 P.2d 483, 487 (1946). The in-
sured is under no obligation to permit a sham defense to be set up in his name, nor can he be
expected to verify any pleadings which he does not believe to be true, 13 Cal. 2d at 329, 89 P.2d at
646. He cannot, however, preclude the company from setting up any defense at all, nor can he
arbitrarily or unreasonably decline to assist in making any fair and legitimate defense. Bachman
v. Independence Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 478, 297 P. 110, 115 (1931). An insured who
declines to allow any defense that does not admit his liability has breached his duty to cooperate
with the insurance company, regardless of the insured's good faith belief in his liability. Id.
32. The failure to attend deposition or trial is the most obvious example of a breach of the
cooperation clause by the insured. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller, 5 Cal. App. 3d 837,
842-43, 85 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1970). But see Panhans v. Associated Indem. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 2d
532, 539, 47 P.2d 791, 793 (1935). Such a breach generally results in the entry of a default judg-
ment against the defendant. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2034(d). The insured breaches the
cooperation clause by making it impossible for the insurer to ascertain his whereabouts or com-
municate with him. 5 Cal. App. 3d at 841-42, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90. Thus, it has been held that
the insured breached the cooperation clause even though the insurer never requested the insured
to attend trial or to keep the insurer informed of his whereabouts. Id. The insurer must, however,
exercise due diligence in an attempt to locate and provide for the attendance of the insured at trial
or deposition. Billington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal. 2d 728, 744, 456 P.2d 982, 992, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 336 (1969). In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Moore, the court held that the
insurer had exercised due diligence where it employed a private investigator, checked credit
sources, inquired of the FBI, checked the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, and com-
municated with the parents of the insured. 5 Cal. App. 3d at 841-42, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
33. Breach of the cooperation clause is not limited to the failure to appear at trial, but may
occur before the trial by reason of the failure of the insured to participate in trial preparation.
Hall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308-09, 93 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161-62 (1971). Where
the insured initially appeared at the office of the attorneys retained by his insurer and verified the
answer, but later ignored requests sent by registered mail to be deposed, ignored personal contact
by the insurer requesting his attendance at deposition, and ignored the requests of his counsel to
talk with them in the preparation of the defense, the court found a breach of the cooperation
clause and allowed attorneys for the insured to withdraw from the case. Id at 309, 93 Cal. Rptr.
at 162.
34. The cooperation clause may also be breached where the insured cooperates with the
plaintiff in establishing his claim against the insurer. See generally Insured Cooperation with
Claimant in Establishing Valid Claim Against Insurer as Breach of Cooperation Clause, Annot., 8
A.L.R. 3d 1345 (1966); CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR California Automobile Insurance
Law Guide §9.8 (1973 & Supp. 1980). Collusion or fraud between the insured and the plaintiff
relieves the insurer of liability. Bachman v. Independent Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 485, 297
P. 110, 118 (1931). In establishing this affirmative defense, however, the insurer must plead and
prove all the elements of actual fraud. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts
47(1974 & Supp. 1980). Thus, the burden of proof on this affirmative defense tends to be a
rather formidable one. In order to prevail, the insurer cannot merely show that the instired acted
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However, the duty to cooperate can involve legal as well as factual
issues. A difficult question arises where the insured refuses to allow a
particular cross-complaint to be made. Generally, a cross-complaint
may not be made without authorization from the insured.35 The in-
sured, however, may be reluctant to bring in a third party tortfeasor
where, for example, he has an important business relationship with that
party, or for other similar reasons. In such a case, the insurance com-
pany may ultimately be required to pay a larger proportion of the dam-
ages because of the insured's refusal to allow the third party to be
brought in on a cross-complaint. Although there are no California
cases on this precise point, a line of New York cases holds that the
insured has no obligation to the insurer to bring in outside parties, and
therefore does not breach the cooperation clause by refusing to allow a
particular cross-complaint. 6
Similarly, it appears to be an open question whether the insured
breaches the cooperation clause by not consenting to a reasonable set-
tlement. 7 The consent of the insured is not usually required for claims
against liability policies where the insurance policy contains the stan-
dard provision enabling settlement by the insurer as it deems expedi-
ent.38 However, a professional liability policy usually provides that no
claim can be settled without the insured's written consent.3 9 While
with an intent to aid the claimant. See 112 Cal. App. at 480-81, 297 P. at 116. Rather the insurer
must show that the insured made false statements with the specific intent to defraud the company
on a specious claim. Zander v. Texaco, Inc., 259 Cal. App. 2d 793, 806, 66 Cal. Rptr. 561, 569
(1968). It has therefore been held that admissions of fault by the insured to the injured party
accompanied by assurances that the insured's insurance will pay for the injuries and that the
injured party will be "taken care of' does not amount to a violation of the cooperation clause,
notwithstanding language in the policy that the insured will not voluntarily assume any liability.
Porter v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 40 Cal. App. 2d 502, 516, 104 P.2d 1087, 1094 (1940).
It has also been held that there was no breach of the cooperation clause where the insured allowed
a default judgment to be taken against him in return for a covenant not to execute where the
insurer refused to defend, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 804, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69.
In order to prevail on this defense, it must also be shown that the fraud was not "intrinsic"; that
is, that the insurer did not have notice of the collusion prior to the judgment. Id If the insurer
did learn about the collusion before the judgment was rendered, it must exercise whatever remedy
it can during the pendency of the underlying case or it will be estopped from collaterally attacking
the judgment in a later action. Id at 805, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 569-70.
35. Huene v. Carnes, 175 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1981) (unpublished).
36. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Gould, 43 A.D. 462, 467-69, (1974), 352 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543;
Ulanoffv. Croyden Shirt Co., 14 Misc. 13, 16, (1958), 174 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360; American Surety Co.
v. Diamond, 154 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920-21 (1956). See also Osbourne v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 476 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tenn. App. 1971), holding that the insurer had no right to require its
insured to act to distribute liability among other insurers, and failure to do so was not a breach of
the cooperation clause.
37. It should be noted that this issue is most applicable for claims made against a profes-
sional liability policy.
38. See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR California Automobile Insurance Law Guide
§10.13 (1973).
39. In the case of health care providers, the Business and Professions Code requires that the
insurer must have the consent of the insured before entering into any settlement under the policy.
Business and Professions Code Section 801 provides in part:
(b) Every insurer providing professional liability insurance to a physician and surgeon
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there is no express provision for the insurer's recourse if the insured
unreasonably withholds consent, it appears the insured is bound at the
minimum by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in
every insurance contract.40 It has previously been held that the duty to
deal in good faith with the other party applies to the insured as well as
the insurer.4 1 The standard is not applied as strictly against the in-
sured,42 however, and no presumption of bad faith on the part of the
insured would arise, for example, where the insured refused to settle an
action, forcing the matter to trial, and the subsequent judgment was
greater than the proposed settlement. The reasoning is that the insurer
has no reasonable expectation on entering into the contract that the
insured will accept an offer as a means of protecting the insurer from
exposure since the insurer's pecuniary interest is not an object of the
bargain.43 Thus, to establish a breach of the cooperation clause by vir-
tue of the insured's refusal to consent to a settlement, it appears the
insurer must show actual bad faith on the part of the insured.44
Finding a breach of the cooperation clause by the insured is only the
first step in formulating a defense to an action to enforce a judgment
under Insurance Code Section 11580. In addition to this, the insurer
must also demonstrate that it has suffered "substantial prejudice" as a
result of the breach by the insured.
licensed pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2000) of Division 2 or the
Osteopathic Initiative Act shall send a complete report to the Board of Medical Quality
Assurance or the Board of Osteopathic Examiners, as appropriate, as to any settlement
or arbitration award over thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) of a claim or action for dam-
ages for death or personal injury caused by such person's negligence, error or omission in
practice, or rendering of unauthorized professional services. Such report shall be sent
within 30 days after such written settlement agreement has been reduced to writing and
signed by all parties thereto or within 30 days after service of such arbitration award on
the parties.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no insurer shall enter into such a set-
tlement without the written consent of the insured, except that this prohibition shall not
void any settlement entered into without such written consent. The requirement of writ-
ten consent can only be waived by both the insured and the insurer. The provisions of
this section shall only apply to a settlement on a policy of insurance executed or renewed
on or after January 1, 1971.
In the case of other professionals, the custom of the industry is to require consent of the insured
for settlement, and this is typically a provision of the insurance contract.
40. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
41. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altffllisch Construction Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 797, 139
Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (1977).
42. See Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,
919, 610 P.2d 1038, 1045, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1980). This case did not actually involve con-
sent to settlement by Safeway, but the logic is nonetheless persuasive. Safeway was insured by
Travelers up to $50,000, self-insured from $50,000 to $100,000, and insured for excess by Com-
mercial Union for $100,000 to $20 million. Commercial Union sued Safeway contending that it
had the opportunity to settle a $125,000 judgment for $60,000 and did not do so. Given the courts
reasoning, however, there is no reason to believe a "consent" case would be decided differently.
43. Id
44. Seegeneraly 2 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §14.17 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as LONG].
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SHOWING "SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE" IN CALIFORNIA
Witkin states that the most important defense which an insurance
company may invoke when a judgment is rendered against an insured
is the insured's violation of the cooperation clause.45 Nonetheless, this
defense has become so difficult to establish that it has atrophied to the
point where it is virtually useless today. Our research discloses only
two reported California decisions in the nearly 20 years since the for-
mulation of the modern rule in Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Co. 4 6
where the insurer was successful in showing the necessary degree of
prejudice,47 and no California cases in the last ten years where the in-
surer has prevailed.
The California rule holds that a breach of the cooperation clause is
not actionable unless there is a "substantial likelihood" of "substantial
prejudice. '48 The majority view in the United States requires that a
breach by the insured of the cooperation clause be substantial and ma-
terial, but does not specifically require a showing of prejudice.49 The
California rule of "substantial prejudice," however, appears to repre-
sent the current trend in a number of jurisdictions.50
Previously, California vacillated between requiring actual prejudice
and allowing a presumption of prejudice. The rule first adopted in
Hynding v. Home Accident Insurance Co. 51 required actual prejudice
stating that "violation of the condition by the assured cannot be a valid
defense against the injured party unless in the particular case it appears
that the insurance company was substantially prejudiced thereby. '52
The California Supreme Court quickly began backing away from this
view, however, in a number of cases by finding that prejudice could be
presumed as a matter of law when there was no dispute that a substan-
tial breach of a material condition had occurred.53
45. 4 B. WITYIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §763 (1974).
46. 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
47. The two cases are Hall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 304, 93 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1971)
and 411state Ins. Co. v. King, 252 Cal. App. 2d 698, 60 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1967).
48. Billington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal. 2d 728, 737, 456 P.2d at 982, 986-87, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 330, 331 (1969).
49. See LONG, supra note 44, §14.03.
50. LONG, supra note 44, §14.04.
51. 214 Cal. 743, 7 P.2d 999 (1932).
52. Id at 752, 7 P.2d at 1002.
53. See, e.g., Valladao v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 13 Cal. 2d 322, 330, 89 P.2d 643, 646
(1939); Purefoy v. Pacific Auto. Indem. Exch., 5 Cal. 2d 81, 87, 53 P.2d 155, 158 (1935); Wasson v.
Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 207 Cal. App. 2d 464, 467, 24 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667 (1962); National Auto. &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 197 Cal. App. 2d 605, 609-10, 17 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350 (1961); Security Ins.
Co. v. Snyder-Lynch Motors, 183 Cal. App. 2d 574, 581, 7 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 (1960); Gibson v.
Colonial Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 33, 36, 206 P.2d 387, 388 (1949); Wright v. Farmer's Auto.
Inter-Insurance Exch., 39 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75, 102 P.2d 352, 355 (1940); Margellini v. Pacific Auto.
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This "presumed prejudice" view, however, was eventually rejected
by the high court in favor of a return to the stricter standard contained
in the Hynding case. 4 In Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Co., the
"substantial prejudice" portion of the rule was affirmed 56 and the
Supreme Court unequivocally disapproved all previous cases that had
stated that prejudice could be presumed or found as a matter of law. 7
In Campbell, the insured, who had been drinking, rear-ended the
plaintiff. When served with summons and complaint, the insured
failed to notify defendant and failed to answer the complaint. A de-
fault judgment was eventually entered in the amount of $35,829.91, and
plaintiff filed an action under Insurance Code Section 11580 against
defendant insurer for the $10,000.00 policy limits. The insurer asserted
the defense of breach of the cooperation clause. The court had no diffi-
culty in finding that the insured had breached the insurance contract by
failing to cooperate. 8 However, the court held that this alone was not
a sufficient defense to an action under Section 11580(b)(2).19 The
Supreme Court held that the insurer had the additional burden of
proving that it was "substantially prejudiced" by the lack of coopera-
tion.6" The Supreme Court reversed the earlier trial court decision for
the insurer and directed that judgment be entered for plaintiff on the
basis that the evidence was clear that a jury would have found for the
plaintiff even if the insured had cooperated.6 t
Subsequently, the modem rule was made even more restrictive in
Billington v. Interinsurance Exchange,62 where the court held that the
insurer must show the "substantial likelihood" of "substantial
prejudice," rather than merely the reasonable probability.63 Not only
did the Billington court add the "substantial likelihood" standard, it
also held that substantial prejudice could be shown only by establishing
that a defense verdict would have been rendered, but for the breach. 4
In B'llington, the insured had also been drinking and driving, but in
Ins. Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 93, 98, 91 P.2d 136, 139 (1939); Distributor's Packing Co. v. Pacific
Indem. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 505, 508, 70 P.2d 253, 254 (1937).
54. Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 305-06, 384 P.2d 155, 156-57, 32 Cal. Rptr.
827, 828-29 (1963).
55. 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
56. Id at 305-06, 384 P.2d at 155-56, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
57. Id at 307, 384 P.2d at 157, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 829. The cases disapproved in Campbell,
however, were disapproved only as far as they stated that prejudice could be presumed as a matter
of law. Id Thus these cases should still be good authority as to whether or not a breach of the
cooperation clause has occurred.
58. Id at 305, 384 P.2d at 156, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id at 306-07, 384 P.2d at 157, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
62. 71 Cal. 2d 728, 456 P.2d 982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1969).
63. Id at 737, 456 P.2d at 987, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
64. Id
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this case plaintiff was a passenger. Here, the insured did forward a
copy of the summons and complaint to the insurer, and the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk were affirmatively
alleged in the answer filed to the complaint.
Before the personal injury suit was fied against the insured, he fur-
nished the insurer with a statement in which he denied he was intoxi-
cated on the night of the accident. However, the insured failed to
appear at his deposition on at least seven occasions, in spite of the fact
that "defendant, by registered and unregistered letter, telegrams, tele-
phone calls, and at times, a combination of these methods, urged [in-
sured] to attend."65  Defendant's attorneys and an independent
investigator employed by defendant talked to the insured on the tele-
phone a number of times during this period explaining the necessity for
his attendance at the deposition, and each time, the insured promised
that he would be present at a future date. Eventually, plaintiff filed a
motion to strike the insured's answer, and a default judgment was sub-
sequently entered.
Plaintiff then brought a Section 11580(b)(2) action against defendant,
and the trial court found that the insured had failed to cooperate and
that his conduct had resulted in substantial prejudice.66
Again, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in upholding the finding
that the insured had breached the insurance contract by failing to coop-
erate. 67 However, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had ap-
plied an improper standard to determine whether the breach of the
cooperation clause had resulted in substantial prejudice.68 The trial
court had found that the insurer had been prejudiced since it had been
precluded from offering any evidence in support of the affirmative de-
fenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, and that
the trier of fact could have reasonably accepted these defenses.69 The
Supreme Court held that it was insufficient that the trier of fact could
have reasonably found for the defendant, rather the insurer must show
the "substantial ikelihood."70 In formulating this stricter standard, the
Supreme Court explained:
We hold, therefore, that an insurer, in order to establish it was
prejudiced by the failure of the insured to cooperate in his defense,
must establish at the very least that if the cooperation clause had not
been breached, there was a substantial likelihood the trier of fact
65. Id. at 734, 456 P.2d at 985, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
66. Id at 736, 456 P.2d at 986, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
67. Id at 737, 456 P.2d at 986-87, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 330-31.
68. Id
69. Id at 736, 456 P.2d at 986, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
70. Id at 736-37, 456 P.2d at 986-87, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 330-31.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 13
would have found in the insured's favor.7 1
Thus, the defense of breach of the cooperation clause is apparently
available only in those cases where there is a substantial likelihood that
there would have been a defense verdict, but for the breach by the in-
sured.72 The insurer is denied a remedy in all other situations. No
other state applies the "substantial prejudice" rule as restrictively as
California.73 Therefore, due to the Billing/on case, it is more difficult in
California for the insurer to pursue a remedy for breach of the coopera-
tion clause than in any other jurisdiction in the Union.
Bilington was decided prior to the adoption of comparative fault in
California. Since fault is now apportioned on a percentage basis,
rather than an all-or-nothing basis, it stands to reason that the mandate
of Billington should be modified to reflect the current practice.
APPLYING THE Li PRINCIPLES TO BILLINGTON
A. Where Comparative Fault Is an Issue
Under the decision in Billington, it is possible for the insurer to be
without remedy even though there is no dispute that the insured
breached the cooperation clause and that the damages would have been
significantly less had there been no breach. Presumably, a verdict for
plaintiff finding plaintiff 95% negligent is still not a verdict "in the in-
sured's favor." Thus, if the insurer is forced to take a default in the
main suit because of the insured's failure to cooperate, in defending
against the enforcement of the default judgment under Insurance Code
Section 11580, it must presumably show that the insured was zero per-
cent negligent. This imposes a virtually impossible and manifestly un-
fair task on the insurer.
There have been no reported decisions since Billing/on clarifying
what constitutes a "finding in the insured's favor" for the purposes of
an action under Insurance Code Section 11580. At the time Bilington
was decided, however, any contributory negligence by the plaintiff
71. Id at 737, 456 P.2d at 987, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
72. See notes 63-71 and accompanying text supra.
73. Other states applying the substantial prejudice rule require prejudice to be established
only by a preponderance of the evidence, not a substantial likelihood. See, e.g., Farley v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 91 Idaho 37, 39, 415 P.2d 680, 682 (1966); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 66 11. 2d 492,
498-500, 363 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1977); Jamison v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 120, 125,
127, 309 P.2d 394, 399 (1957); Home Indem. v. Walker, 216 Md. 684, 687-88, 273 A.2d 429, 431
(1971); Hendrix v. Jones, 580 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Mo. 1979); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 180
Neb. 201, 204-05, 141 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1966); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Esquibel, 94 N.M.
132, 134, 607 P.2d 1150, 1152 (1980); Brakeman v. Potmac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66,-, 371 A.2d 193,
196 (1977); Evans v. American Home Assurance Co., 252 S.C. 411, 420-22, 166 S.E.2d 811, 813
(1969); Washington Ins. Guar. Assn v. Hill, 19 Wash. App. 195, 196-98, 574 P.2d 405, 406 (1978);
McDonnell v. Hestnes, 47 Wis. 2d 553, -, 177 N.W.2d 845, 849 (1970).
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would have resulted in a defense verdict. Therefore, the danger of such
an unfair application of the law was not then present. However, when
the Supreme Court abrogated contributory negligence in favor of the
comparative fault doctrine in Li v. Yellow Cab ,74 it stated that the all-
or-nothing approach was inequitable because it failed to distribute re-
sponsibility in proportion to fault.75 It declared the fundamental pur-
pose of the new system to be to assign responsibility and liability for
damage in direct proportion to the fault of the persons involved.76
If the Billington case is applied literally, it preserves the inequities of
the all-or-nothing approach which Li purported to eliminate. If the
insurer is required to take a default, the plaintiff may get a windfall in a
case where both the injured party and the insured were equally at fault.
Rather than liability being assigned in proportion to fault as required
by Li, the plaintiff will recover 100 percent of his damages despite his
50 percent negligence.
The most reasonable approach to harmonize the Billing/on rule with
the Li principles is to allow the insurer to show "substantial prejudice"
by showing the amount of negligence that would have been attributable
to the plaintiff, had the insured cooperated. Where the case is actually
litigated on its merits, this would allow the insurer to show that the
apportionment of fault at trial would have been different, had the in-
sured cooperated. Where a default is taken without the case being
heard on its merits, this would allow the company to seek a determina-
tion of the respective fault of the insured and the plaintiff and offset the
default judgment by the amount of the plaintiff's proportion of fault.
If this approach were adopted, the insurer would have a much more
effective remedy for breach of the cooperation clause. While the in-
surer would still have to establish the "substantial ikelihood," not the
reasonable probability, of prejudice, it could at least establish substan-
tial prejudice by simply showing that the comparative fault of the par-
ties would have been different, but for the breach. It would then be
economically feasible for the insurer to contest as little as a ten percent
difference in the apportionment of fault due to the insured's noncoop-
eration when the judgment in the underlying action was in excess of
$100,000. The plaintiff's judgment against the insured, of course,
would not be affected in any way, since this would amount to a collat-
eral attack on the judgment.7 7 Only the liability of the insurance com-
74. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
75. Id at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
76. Id at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
77. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Attack on Judgment in Trial Court,
§4-15 (1971 & Supp. 1981).
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pany would be adjudicated. As to the insured, the original judgment
would be resjudicata, and he would be personally liable to the plaintiff
for the difference in the original judgment and the subsequent litigation
under Insurance Code Section 11580.
While the Li principles are most applicable in comparative fault
cases, the above rationale also finds application in cases where compar-
ative fault is not raised as an affirmative defense, but where excessive
damages are awarded.
B. Where Comparative Fault Is Not an Issue
In cases where comparative fault is not an issue, the meaning of a
finding "in the insured's favor" is not susceptible to the ambiguities
discussed above.78 Nonetheless, where the insured breaches the coop-
eration clause and this conduct results in a higher damage award by the
trier of fact than would otherwise be the case, equitable consideration
would indicate that the insurer has been prejudiced and should have
the same opportunity to shift liability for the difference to the guilty
party. Thus, where the insurer can establish the substantial likelihood
that the award of damages would have been less but for the breach by
the insured of the cooperation clause, it should be allowed to reduce its
liability by that amount.
This rule would be consistent with both the spirit of Li and practical
observations contained in other leading cases. Previous opinions have
recognized that the presence or absence of an insured at trial and his
conduct, if present, may have a significant effect on the credibility of
the defense case and the amount of damages awarded. 9 Since the lia-
bility of the insurance company does not generally extend to damages
resulting from the insured's intentionally noncooperative conduct, it
would be consistent with the spirit of Li to require the insured to bear
responsibility for this portion of the damages, providing his conduct is
serious enough to amount to a breach. The insured would be protected
from overreaching by the insurer since the insurer would still have the
burden of establishing that a breach had occurred and that there is a
substantial likelihood that damages would have been less, had there
been no breach. The insurer, on the other hand, is protected from pay-
ing damages which are outside both the scope of policy and the reason-
able expectations of the parties.
78. See notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
79. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller, 5 Cal. App. 3d 837, 842, 85 Cal. Rptr. 288,
290 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 252 Cal. App. 2d 698, 710, 60 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
Considerable progress toward policing the insurance industry has
been made recently. However, in the zeal to make sure that the indi-
vidual is treated fairly, the reciprocal right of the insurance company to
be treated fairly must not be disregarded. The law nominally recog-
nizes the inherent unfairness of requiring the insurer to pay a verdict
when it has not had a reasonable opportunity to defend against it be-
cause of the conduct of the insured. But in order to avail itself of this
right, the insurer must show the "substantial likelihood" of "substantial
prejudice." This "double substantial" standard has proved to be such a
burden that it has all but eliminated the insurer's remedy." In order to
provide the insurer with some effective remedy for a breach by the in-
sured of the cooperation clause, the insurer should be allowed to show
prejudice in those cases where comparative fault is an issue by showing
that the allocation of fault would have been different if not for the
breach by the insured. In addition, whether or not comparative fault is
an issue in a particular case, the insured should be allowed to show
prejudice by showing that damages would have been less, but for the
breach by the insured. If followed, this proposal would provide insur-
ers with the remedy they deserve, but still be consistent with existing
standards.
80. Concerning the substantial prejudice rule, Appelman observes that:
Such a rule is probably salutary where it is evident that the insured's infraction did
not seriously impair the insurer's investigation or defense of the action. But if the rule is
carried to the point of imposing an almost insurmountable burden of proving that the
verdict was the result of the lack of cooperation, it would amount to a perversion of such
contractual provision.
8 APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §4773 (1981).

